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NOTE
RIGHT, BUT FOR THE WRONG REASONS:
HOW A CERTIFIED QUESTION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA COULD HAVE
ALLEVIATED CONFLICTING VIEWS AND
BROUGHT CLARITY TO NORTH
CAROLINA STATE LAW
SHARIKA ROBINSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Unconstitutional or dogmatic, North Carolina is the only state that
has never enacted a procedure by which a federal court could certify a
question of state law to its state Supreme Court.' As a result, federal
courts, facing unanswered issues of North Carolina law that are at-
tempting to abide by the Erie doctrine are forced to take a guess as to
how the Supreme Court of North Carolina would decide such un-
resolved issues of state law.2 There are but two scenarios which could
result from the current federal court guesswork of how the Supreme
Court of North Carolina would interpret North Carolina state law.
One, the federal court could interpret the statute correctly; that is,
decide it in the same manner as the Supreme Court of North Carolina
would if so required. This is the result one hopes for. Two, the federal
court could interpret the statute incorrectly, which would result in an
impasse of federal and state law. This is the result one should prepare
for. As the old idiom goes, "Hope for the best and prepare for the
worst."' Either way, the result is inevitable: principles of federalism
* B.S., North Carolina State University, 2005; J.D. Candidate, North Carolina Central
University School of Law, Class of 2012. I would like to thank the Honorable James A. Wynn
for the topic and encouraging me to embark in legal scholarship, Assistant Professor Todd Clark,
Professor Reginald Mombrun, Professor Thomas M. Ringer, and Associate Dean of Academic
Affairs Wendy Scott, for their support, motivation, and/or advice, and my colleagues on the
NCCU Law Review for all of their diligence and hard work.
1. Eric Eisenberg, A Divine Comity: Certification (At Last) in North Carolina, 58 DuKF
L.J. 69, 69 (2008).
2. UNI. C RIFICATION OF QilESTIONS Ow LAw Aer, Prefatory Note, 12 U.L.A. 61, 61-62
(1995).
3. Ti!i CONCiSF Oxt OR)D D-ICTIONARY 01 PROVERBS 114, (J.A. Simpson ed., Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1982).
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are evaded and North Carolina law becomes the subject of a federal
court's interpretation.4 Preparation in this instance could be achieved
by developing a certification process.' On the other hand, if the cur-
rent process is not refined, it could result in a Pandora's Box where a
state court reverses the holding of a federal court.6
Viewed in the composite, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938), and the Rules of Decision Act establish that federal courts
do not have the authority to displace state law.7 Pursuant to § 34 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Rules of Decision Act provided that,
"The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, trea-
ties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."8 Over half a
century later, Justice Joseph Story declared in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1
(1842), that the textual meaning of "laws" written in the Judiciary Act
of 1789 only applied to state statutes, that state courts' opinions were
not binding on federal courts, and that federal courts could create fed-
eral common law.' In the landmark decision of Erie, the Supreme
Court of the United States overruled the holding in Swift, noting that
the decision encouraged forum shopping, decreased uniformity of
state law, and denied citizens equal protection under the laws of the
state.'o The Court in Erie noted:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.
And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature
4. 12 U.L.A. 61, 61-62 (noting the federal courts have been forced to guess what the state
court might rule if the precise issue of law were presented to it). See also Jessica Smith, Avoiding
Prognostication and Promoting Federalism: The Need for an Inter-Jurisdictional Certification
Procedure in North Carolina, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 2123, 2135 (1999) ("And when federal courts
decide unsettled questions of state law in cases involving policy judgments with widespread im-
pact, the intrusion on state sovereignty is at its greatest.").
5. 12 U.L.A. 61, 61-62 (noting that a certification process could potentially alleviate vari-
ance in how the federal courts interpret and apply state law and potentially prevent federal
courts from intruding into state matters).
6. John R. Brown, Certification - Federalism in Action, 7 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 455, 455
(1977) (noting that the state may reverse federal court holdings that make a "guess" at constru-
ing state law). See also R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) ("In this
situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue by making a tentative answer which
may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication. The reign of law is hardly promoted if an
unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state
court." (citations omitted)).
7. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-13 (1981). See also Stewart Org.,
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37-38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. Judiciary Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (corresponds to the Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92).
9. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938).
10. Erie, 304 U.S. at 89-90.
2312012]
2
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 2 [2012], Art. 6
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol34/iss2/6
232 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:230
in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of
federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress
has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in
a State whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal
courts.'
While Erie directed federal courts to consider state law when adju-
dicating a state matter, Erie provided no guidance on how to proceed
when the highest court in the state has not decided the issue before
the federal court.1 2 In West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
311 U.S. 223 (1940), the Supreme Court of the United States offered
guidance, holding that:
Where an intermediate appellate state court rests its considered judg-
ment upon the rule of law which it announces, that is a datum for
ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court
unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of
the state would decide otherwise.' 3
Thus, distinguishable from the decisions of a state's highest court, fed-
eral courts are not strictly bound by decisions of a state's appellate
courts. 14
In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), the
Supreme Court of the United States introduced the doctrine of ab-
stention, allowing federal courts the discretion to abstain from an-
swering state law questions.' 5 When a federal court abstains, it stays
litigation in federal court."6 Litigants obtain answers from state court
via a declaratory judgment." After the declaratory judgment is ob-
tained from the state court, the federal court resumes litigation.' 8 As
one could imagine, this is a long and arduous process.' 9 In an attempt
to expedite the process, federal courts began to explore certification.2 0
Certification is the process by which a federal court, confronted
with a question of unsettled state law, may submit questions to the
state's supreme court rather than guess at how the state's supreme
11. Id. at 78.
12. See id.
13. West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940).
14. See id.
15. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (noting it is appropriate
for United States federal courts to abstain from hearing a case to allow state courts to decide
substantial issues of state law).
16. 32A Am. JuR. 21 Federal Courts § 1054 (2007).
17. Id. at § 1065.
18. Id. at § 1067.
19. Id. at § 1064.
20. UNIw. CERrH AION OF QuIsIoNs o LAw Aei, Prefatory Note, 12 U.L.A. 61, 62
(1995) ("[Certification] is a more rapid method than the use of the abstention doctrine and
seems to be a much more orderly way of handling the problem.").
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court would decide the issue.2 1 This process was first endorsed by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).22 In Clay, the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded a Fifth Circuit decision, noting there were unresolved issues
of Florida state law present and urged the court to utilize Florida's
certification process to address those issues.2 3 Since Clay, the usage of
the certification process has grown.24 The Supreme Court has noted
that the certification procedure is an example of cooperative federal-
ism and preserves judicial economy.25 The compelling results of certi-
fication processes throughout the country may explain why North
Carolina remains companionless in its effort to abstain from enacting
its own certification procedures.
Rather than explaining reasons that may clarify North Carolina's
decision to abstain from enacting a certification procedure,2 6 this Note
addresses the effect of North Carolina's lack of a certification process
by examining United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771 (4th Cir. 2011),
where the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, split regarding its interpreta-
tion of North Carolina's Indecent Liberties with Children Statute
("Indecent Liberties Statute")" resulting in "a mess of opinions. "28
First, this Note presents the facts of Vann. The Note then explores the
legal history of the Indecent Liberties Statute and the legal back-
ground regarding its application. The Note then transitions into the
holding of Vann. The Note concludes that the majority opinion en-
tered the correct judgment; however, due to the ambiguities of North
Carolina's case law,2 it is possible that judgment was based upon an
incorrect analysis of North Carolina law. Thus, a certification process
in North Carolina is critical to resolving analogous issues in the future.
Further, this Note opines that, because the interpretation of North
Carolina's Indecent Liberties Statute by federal courts is inconsistent
in different federal circuits and districts, individuals with convictions
under North Carolina law are not afforded equal protection under the
laws.
21. Id. at 61-62.
22. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960).
23. Id.
24. J. Michael Medina, The Interjurisdictional Certification of Question of Law Experience:
Federal, State, and Oklahoma- Should Arkansas Follow?, 45 ARK. L. Rv. 99, 104-06 (1992).
25. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (stating that certification "in the long
run save[s] time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism"). See
also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150 (1976).
26. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 1. See also Smith, supra note 4, at 2125.
27. United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 772 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (plurality opinion).
28. Posting of Robyn Hagan Cain to FindLaw, http://blogs.findlaw.com/fourth circuit/2011/
10/fourth-cir-overturns-armed-career-criminal-sentence-enhancement.html (Oct. 12, 2011, 15:04
EST) (noting the decision included seven separate opinions and totaled one hundred pages).
29. Vann, 660 F.3d at 790.
2332012]
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II. THE FACTS
Torrell Vann ("Vann") was arrested in possession of a handgun on
January 20, 2008, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924.30 In
November of 2008, a grand jury indicted Vann with one count of pos-
session of a handgun by a violent felon pursuant to § 922(g)(1) and
§ 924 and alleged that Vann was subject to enhanced sentencing pur-
suant to § 924(e)(1). 3 1 Pursuant to § 924(e)(1), if the accused has
three or more violent felony convictions, as defined under the Armed
Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), the accused is subject to an en-
hanced sentencing of a minimum of fifteen years with a maximum of
life imprisonment.3 2 The ACCA defines a "violent felony" as:
... any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii)
is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or other-
wise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another . . .33
Without the ACCA enhanced sentencing, Vann was subject to a maxi-
mum of ten years in prison.34 On December 15, 2008, Vann pleaded
guilty as charged. 5 Vann's presentence report ("PSR") indicated that
he had three prior convictions for violating the Indecent Liberties
Statute under chapter 14, section 202.1 of the North Carolina General
Statutes. 36 The Statute provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of taking indecent liberties with children if, being 16
years of age or more and at least five years older than the child in
question, he either: (1) Willfully takes or attempts to take any im-
moral, improper, or indecent liberties with any child of either sex
under the age of 16 years for the purpose of arousing or gratifying
sexual desire; or (2) Willfully commits or attempts to commit any lewd
or lascivious act upon or with the body or any part or member of the
body of any child of either sex under the age of 16 years.37
Taking into account the ACCA enhanced sentencing, the probation
officer calculated Vann's sentence as carrying a statutory minimum of
180 months.3 8 Vann objected to the enhanced sentencing, citing
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), and United States v.
30. Id. at 772.
31. Id.
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
33. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).
34. See id. § 922(g).
35. Vann, 660 F.3d at 772.
36. Id.
37. N.C. Gen. Stat § 14-202.1 (2011).
38. Vann, 660 F.3d at 809.
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Thornton, 554 F.3d 443 (4th Cir. 2009), as support.3 9 The government
refuted Vann's argument, noting the PSR calculation was correct and
citing United States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2002), as support
for its proposition.40 The district court found the government's argu-
ment persuasive finding that Vann's prior convictions were ACCA vi-
olent felonies.4 1 On March 17, 2009, Vann was sentenced to the
statutory minimum of fifteen years in prison.4 2
Vann filed a timely appeal 43 alleging that pursuant to Begay, not
''every crime that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another" is a violent felony for ACCA purposes; rather, only those
crimes "that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk
posed, to" burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of
explosives.4 4 Therefore, according to Vann, the Fourth Circuit's hold-
ing in Pierce is implicitly overruled by Begay; and thus, his previous
convictions are not sufficient to invoke enhanced sentencing under the
ACCA.4 5 Vann contended further that pursuant to North Carolina
case law, an accused need not touch or be in the presence of a victim
to be convicted pursuant to Indecent Liberties Statute.4 6 Hence,
Vann argued that the indecent liberties offense cannot satisfy the re-
quirements of an ACCA violent felony.47 To illustrate this perspec-
tive, Vann argued the Court should follow United States v. Thorton,
554 F.3d 443 (4th Cir., 2009), a post-Begay, Fourth Circuit decision
where the court, guided by Virginia law, concluded that Virginia's
statutory rape offense is not an ACCA violent felony because it does
not require force.4 8
On appeal, the government argued that Vann's prior convictions for
indecent liberties were ACCA violent felonies because established
Fourth Circuit case law indicated that a violation of the Indecent Lib-
erties Statute is a crime of violence in the context of the Sentencing
39. Id. at 773. See generally Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (holding that a
driving under the influence offense is not a violent felony within the meaning of the ACCA);
United States v. Thornton, 554 F.3d 443 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a Virginia statutory rape
offense is not a violent felony within the meaning of the ACCA).
40. Vann, 660 F.3d at 773. See generally, United States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 290 (4th Cir.
2002) (holding a conviction under the Indecent Liberties Statute is a crime of violence for pur-
poses under the career offender enhancement sentencing guidelines).
41. Vann, 660 F.3d at 773.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 779 (citing Begay, 553 U.S. at 142-43).
45. United States v. Vann, 620 F.3d 431, 434 (4th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
2352012]
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Guidelines' career-offender enhancement. 49  Thus, the government
relied on the argument that an ACCA violent felony is interchangea-
ble with a "crime of violence" for career-offender enhancement.o
Additionally, the government argued that the offense qualifies as a
violent felony pursuant to ACCA because, as Pierce held, it "involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an-
other."' Thus, the government maintained that if an offense presents
a serious potential risk to another, it satisfies the "residual" provision
of the ACCA.5 2
In the majority opinion written by Judge Niemeyer, in which Judge
Shedd joined, the Court concluded that North Carolina's Indecent
Liberties Statute criminalized two different types of behavior noting,
"One requires physical acts against the body of a child, and the other
does not."5 ' Thus, the Court applied the modified categorical ap-
proach to determine which crime was the basis for Vann's conviction
and whether Vann's offense was a qualifying violent felony. 54 The
Court consulted Vann's PSR that echoed the language of the Indecent
Liberties Statute, and also, upon request by the Court, it reviewed
Vann's charging documents. After applying the modified categorical
approach, the Court concluded that because Vann pleaded guilty to
the offense, it need not be determined which prong of the offense
Vann committed.5 6 Accordingly, the majority held that Vann's prior
offenses satisfied the ACCA definition of violent felony because tak-
ing indecent liberties with a child by "willfully committing a lewd or
49. Id. at 433-34 (quoting United States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 2002)) (quot-
ing further that "by its nature, [taking indecent liberties] present[s] a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another").
50. See id. at 433.
51. Id. at 433-34 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006)).
52. Id. (using the term the "residual provision" to refer to the portion of the violent felony
definition in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006) that includes any crime which "otherwise in-
volves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another"). See also
United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 779 n.2 (4th Cir. 2011) (describing the government's early
argument that, because of the victim's age under the Indecent Liberties Statute, the offense
implies constructive force that qualifies it as a violent felony pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2006), and the government's subsequent abandonment of this argument in
light of the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1270 (2010),
that an offense involving "intellectual force or emotional force" without violent physical force is
insufficient to qualify as a violent felony under the statute).
53. Vann, 620 F.3d at 436. See generally Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 15 (2005)
(indicating that the modified categorical approach may be only be applied in narrow circum-
stances where a statute is broad, such that it prohibits many different type of behavior).
54. Vann, 620 F.3d at 435-36. See also Shepard, 544 U.S. at 17 (2005) (noting that where the
modified categorical approach is applied, a court is not limited to the examining the elements of
the statute, it can review the particular facts disclosed by the record of conviction, such as, the
indictment to determine whether the offense meets the definition of a violent felony under the
ACCA).
55. Vann, 620 F.3d at 437-38.
56. Id. at 438 n.2.
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lascivious act upon or with the body of the child" resulted in "a poten-
tial risk of physical injury to the child that is at least as serious as the
risk facing a victim of arson or burglary."" As such, the Court af-
firmed Vann's sentence.ss
In Judge King's dissenting opinion, he noted that North Carolina's
Indecent Liberties Statute does not contain two criminal offenses; but
rather, it criminalizes a single crime.59 Judge King further noted that
it cannot be determined whether Vann violated the second prong of
the Statute from the PSR or the charging documents. 60 Lastly, Judge
King noted that the second prong of the Statute is not a violent crime
for purposes of the ACCA.61
Vann filed a timely petition for rehearing en banc.62 The Court
granted Vann's petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the panel
opinion. In the majority, per curiam opinion, the Court concluded
that North Carolina's Indecent Liberties Statute criminalizes two
types of offenses.64 Thus, the Court invoked the modified categorical
approach. 65 After analyzing the documents, the Court held that it
could not determine whether Vann pleaded guilty to subsection (a)(1)
or subsection (a)(2) of the offense.66 Accordingly, the Court vacated
Vann's sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings.67
Judge King wrote a concurring opinion in which he concurred with the
judgment reached by the Court, but expressed the view that the cate-
gorical approach, rather than the modified categorical approach,
should have been applied by the Court.68 Judge Keenan also wrote a
concurring opinion in which she agreed with the majority opinion's
decision and reasoning, but wrote separately to explain why she be-
lieved the Court was permitted to apply the modified categorical ap-
proach.69 In a concurring opinion, Judge Wilkinson noted that he did
not adopt the majority opinion, indicating "too many courts are too
57. Id. at 441 (quoting United States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 290 (4th Cir. 2002)).
58. Id. at 442.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 773 (4th Cir. 2011) (Duncan, J. recused).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 773-74 (en banc with Traxler, J., Wilkinson, J., Motz, J., King, J., Gregory, J.,
Agee, J., Davis, J., Keenan, J., Wynn, J., and Diaz, J. voting that Vann's enhanced sentence be
vacated).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 776-77.
68. Id. at 787 (King, J., concurring and joined by Motz, J., Gregory, J., and Davis, J.); See
also id. at 782 (arguing that the North Carolina Indecent Liberties Statute criminalizes one of-
fense as interpreted by the North Carolina courts).
69. Id. at 798, 801 (Traxler, J., concurring and joined by Agee, J., Wynn, J., and Diaz, J.).
2372012]
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deep in the weeds on the matter of the ACCA's residual clause. ."7
As such, Judge Wilkinson focused on the intent of the ACCA and
concluded that the Court appropriately applied the modified categori-
cal approach." Dissenting, Judge Niemeyer reiterated his conclusion
in the panel opinion that North Carolina's Indecent Liberties Statute
criminalizes two offenses; therefore, the majority was correct to apply
the modified categorical approach.7 2 However, Judge Niemeyer
noted that the majority was incorrect to conclude that Vann's guilty
plea does not evidence that Vann pleaded guilty to subsection (a)(2)
of North Carolina's Indecent Liberties Statute, which would be con-
sidered violent in nature under the ACCA.7 3
III. BACKGROUND
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a person who
has been convicted previously of a felony to possess a firearm.7 4 A
defendant convicted of a violation of § 922(g)(1) is subject to the sen-
tence enhancement pursuant to § 924(e) provided the underlying con-
viction is a violent felony for ACCA purposes.7' A prior felony
conviction is a qualifying ACCA violent felony if it requires the use of
physical force, is a burglary, arson, extortion, involves the use of ex-
plosives, or presents a serious risk of physical injury to another similar
to the risk associated with the offenses listed above.76 The issue
before the Fourth Circuit in Vann was whether North Carolina's Inde-
cent Liberties Statute involves conduct that presents a serious poten-
tial risk of physical injury to another, thus qualifying as a violent
felony pursuant to § 924(e).
A. The United States Supreme Court's Guidance
The Supreme Court has provided a road map for federal courts to
use in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony
within the meaning of the ACCA and thus, warrants enhanced sen-
tencing. In Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), the Supreme
Court explained that a sentencing court, in applying § 944(e), must
70. Id. at 801.
71. Id. at 801-02 ("It cannot have been the intent of Congress to categorically sweep up all
sorts of non-violent indecent liberties offenses as predicate ACCA crimes. Neither, however,
can it possibly have been the intent of Congress to categorically exclude as predicates those
crimes where minors were victimized by violent sexual assaults. For the reasons that follow, I
believe the court has no choice but to adopt in this case a modified categorical approach.").
72. Id. at 807.
73. Id. at 808.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
75. Id. § 924(e).
76. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).
77. Vann, 660 F.3d at 778.
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employ a "formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory
definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts under-
lying those convictions" to determine whether the prior conviction is a
violent felony." "That is, [the court must] consider whether the ele-
ments of the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion
within the residual provision, without inquiring into the specific con-
duct of this particular offender."7 9 The Court went on to describe an
alternate procedure coined the modified categorical approach.a
Starting from Taylor, the Supreme Court has explained that the modi-
fied categorical approach is only proper in limited circumstances when
a statute "cover[s] several different generic crimes, some of which re-
quire violent force and some of which do not . . ."8 In applying the
modified categorical approach, and for the limited purpose of identi-
fying the elements of the prior felony conviction, a court may use the
charging documents and the record of conviction, in addition to the
statutory definition of the offense.82 Since Taylor, the Supreme Court
has held that a court may analyze the "statutory definition, charging
document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and
any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant
assented."8  However, the Supreme Court refused to expand the
scope of a court's analysis to police reports or complaint
applications.84
Before a court can determine whether to apply the modified cate-
gorical approach or the categorical approach to determine whether
the prior offenses are violent felonies for ACCA purposes, a court
must determine whether the statute at issue prohibits one offense or
78. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-01 (1990) (reasoning the categorical approach
should be applied because (1) the language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) supports the inference that the
facts underlying the convictions should not be considered, given that the text indicates "'a per-
son who . . . has three previous convictions' for - not a person who has committed - three
previous violent felonies or drug offenses" (2) the legislative history shows Congress employed
the categorical approach, and (3) a factual approach is not practical and may yield unfair
results).
79. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007).
80. Id. at 227 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1273 (2010). See also Nijhawan v. Holder, 129
S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2009) ("We also noted that the categorical method is not always easy to apply.
That is because sometimes a separately numbered subsection of a criminal statute will refer to
several different crimes, each described separately. And it can happen that some of these crimes
involve violence while others do not."); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (providing in part that "in a State
whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, if the indictment or
information and jury instructions show that the defendant was charged only with a burglary of a
building, and that the jury necessarily had to find an entry of a building to convict, then the
Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement.").
82. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
83. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005) (These documents are known as "Shep-
ard-approved documents.").
84. Id.
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multiple offenses." Thus, the core question before the Fourth Circuit
in Vann was whether North Carolina's Indecent Liberties Statute
comprises a single offense or multiple offenses.86 The interpretation
of the statute, including the elements of the offense, must be deter-
mined by North Carolina law." "Neither [the United States Su-
preme] Court nor any other federal tribunal has any authority to place
a construction on a state statute different from the one rendered by
the highest court of the state."8 8 "[A] federal court is not free to re-
ject the state rule merely because it has not received the sanction of
the highest state court, even though it thinks the rule is unsound in
principle or that another is preferable."" The Fourth Circuit has fur-
ther explained that "only if the decision of a state's intermediate court
cannot be reconciled with state statutes, or decisions of the state's
highest court, or both, may a federal court . . . refuse to follow it." 90
B. The Legislative History of North Carolina's Indecent Liberties
Statute
On April 29, 1955, the General Assembly of North Carolina en-
acted the Indecent Liberties Statute under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
202.1.91 "The purpose of the statute is to give broader protection to
children than the prior laws provided." 92 The Statute originally pro-
vided in pertinent part:
Section 1. Any person over 16 years of age who, with intent to commit
an unnatural sexual act, shall take, or attempt to take, any immoral,
improper, or indecent liberties with any child of either sex, under the
age of 16 years, or who shall, with such intent, commit, or attempt to
commit, any lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part
or member thereof, of such child, shall, for the first offense, be guilty
of a misdemeanor and for a second or subsequent offense shall be
85. See Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1273 (noting that the modified categorical approach is only
employed where the defendant is convicted under a statute that covers multiple offenses).
86. United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771,784 (4th Cir. 2011).
87. See Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1269 ("We are, however, bound by the Florida Supreme
Court's interpretation of state law, including its determination of the elements of Fla. Stat.
§ 784.03(2)."). See also Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967); Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (requiring federal courts to apply state law when deciding
questions of substantive law).
88. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997). See also Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l
Bank, 306 U.S. 103, 107 (1939) (providing that where the case is removed from Texas state court,
it is the duty of the federal court to apply the law of Texas as declared by the state's highest
court).
89. West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1940).
90. Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A. v. Neil, 160 F.3d 997, 1003 (4th Cir. 1998).
91. Act of Apr. 29, 1955, ch. 764, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 708 [hereinafter 1955 Session Law]
(current version at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1 (2011)).
92. State v. Turman, 278 S.E.2d 574, 575 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (citing State v. Harward, 142
S.E.2d 691 (N.C. 1965)).
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guilty of a felony, and shall be fined or imprisoned in the discretion of
the court.93
The purpose of the 1975 amendment to the Statute was "to delete the
requirement of intent to commit an unnatural sex act from the crime
of taking indecent liberties with children and to increase the punish-
ment."9 4 Unlike the original Statute, the amended Statute did not ap-
pear visually as a single offense. However, textually, the amended
statute was similar to the original statute providing in pertinent part:
Taking indecent liberties with children.- (a) A person is guilty of tak-
ing indecent liberties with children if, being 16 years of age or more
and at least five years older than the child in question, he either:
(1) Willfully takes or attempts to take any immoral, improper, or in-
decent liberties with any child of either sex under the age of 16 years
for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire; or
(2) Willfully commits or attempts to commit any lewd or lascivious act
upon or with the body or any part or member of the body of any child
of either sex under the age of 16 years.
(b) Taking indecent liberties with children is a felony punishable by a
fine, imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.
Since 1975, the text of the Statute has remained relatively the same.9 6
C. North Carolina State Case Law Regarding the Interpretation of
North Carolina's Indecent Liberties Statute
In State v. Banks, 370 S.E.2d 398 (N.C. 1988), the Supreme Court of
North Carolina explained that the legislature's revision of the Inde-
cent Liberties Statute that resulted in two subsections did not result in
a substantive change in the Statute." The Court noted that the ele-
ments of the present Statute include "the age requirements . . . under
subsection (1) an 'immoral, improper, or indecent' liberty committed
'for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire' and under sub-
93. 1955 Session Law, supra note 91.
94. Act of Oct. 1, 1975, ch. 779, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1105 (current version at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-202.1 (2011)) (senate bill entitled "An Act to Amend G.S. 14-202.1 to Delete the
Requirement of Intent to Commit an Unnatural Sex Act From the Crime of Taking Indecent
Liberties with Children and to Increase the Punishment") [hereinafter 1975 Session Law]. See
generally State v. Harward, 142 S.E.2d 691 (N.C. 1965) ("The court has the right to look to the
title of an ambiguous statute for the purpose of determining the meaning thereof and the legisla-
tive intent" (citing State v. Keller, 199 S.E. 620 (N.C. 1938); State v. Woolard, 25 S.E. 719 (N.C.
1896)).
95. 1975 Session Law, supra note 94.
96. See Act of June 4, 1979, ch. 760, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 866 (replacing the phrase "a
felony punishable by a fine, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both" with "punishable
as a Class H felony"); Act of July 24, 1993, ch. 539, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2788 (replacing the
phrase "punishable as a Class H felony " with "punishable as a Class F felony").
97. State v. Banks, 370 S.E.2d 398, 407 (1988). See also State v. Swann, 370 S.E.2d 533, 539-
40 (N.C. 1988) (comparing the offense of taking indecent liberties with a child as described in
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1 to first degree sexual assault, a single offense crime, and the noting
similarities between the two statutes).
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section (2), a 'lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body or any part
or member of the body' of the child."" Thus, it can be implied that
subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Indecent Liberties Statute
criminalize two distinct offenses.
However, two years later the Supreme Court of North Carolina ex-
plained in State v. Hartness, 391 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. 1990), that the Inde-
cent Liberties Statute, "indicates, the crime of indecent liberties is a
single offense which may be proved by evidence of the commission of
any one of a number of acts." 99 In Hartness, defendant was convicted
at the trial level in violation of the Indecent Liberties Statute.'00 De-
fendant appealed maintaining that the trial court committed plain er-
ror that improperly permitted his conviction by less than a unanimous
verdict1 0 ' given that the jury was instructed that in order to find defen-
dant guilty of indecent liberties, the State must prove "[tihat the de-
fendant wilfully [sic] took an indecent liberty with a child for the
purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire."102 The trial court fur-
ther described an indecent liberty as, "an immoral, improper or inde-
cent touching or act by the defendant upon the child, or an
inducement by the defendant of an immoral or indecent touching by
the child." 0 3 The Supreme Court of North Carolina found that the
particular act performed is immateriallO4 and that "[d]efendant's pur-
pose for committing such act is the gravamen of this offense."ios In its
analysis, the Court reviewed the holding in State v. Diaz, 346 S.E.2d
488 (N.C. 1986), a drug trafficking case in which the jury was in-
structed that a defendant should be found guilty if it found defendant
either possessed or transported marijuana. 1 06  On review, the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina held that possessing and transporting
98. Banks, 370 S.E.2d at 407 (quoting N.C. Gen Stat. §14-202.1 and noting that putting ones
tongue in a child's ears, mouth or nose can be penalized under either subsection).
99. State v. Hartness, 391 S.E.2d 177, 180 (N.C. 1990) (reasoning is arguably ambiguous
because, when referring to the Statute, the Court only references subsection (a)(1)).
100. Id. at 178 ("Defendant was indicted for one count of first-degree rape, two counts of
first-degree sexual offense, two counts of felony child abuse, three counts of taking indecent
liberties with a minor, and one count of incest. . . . Defendant was found guilty of two counts of
felony child abuse and three counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor.").
101. Id. ("Defendant contends that the trial court's disjunctive phrasing as to the acts alleg-
edly constituting indecent liberties in this case - defendant's touching of his stepson or the step-
son's touching of defendant - rendered the verdict potentially nonunanimous.").
102. Id.
103. Id. ("The State's evidence tended to show that defendant engaged in various forms of
sexual relations with his daughter, who was seven years old at the time of trial, and his stepson,
who was nine years old at the time of trial. The boy testified at trial that defendant touched
the boy's 'hotdog' with both his hands and his mouth. The boy identified his 'hotdog' as his penis
and additionally testified that defendant induced him to touch defendant's penis with his hands
and mouth.").
104. Id. at 180.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 179.
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were two separate offenses under the relevant drug trafficking statute;
thus, the trial court in Diaz erred in its jury instruction. 10 7 The Hart-
ness Court then distinguished the drug trafficking statute from the In-
decent Liberties Statute, finding that subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of
the Statute describe a single offense and not two discrete criminal
activities.1 0 8
In State v. Hammett, 642 S.E.2d 454 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007), the Court
of Appeals of North Carolina further expressed that the Indecent Lib-
erties Statute describes a single offense, noting a defendant can be
found guilty of the same conduct under either subsection (a)(1) or
(a)(2).109 Furthermore, the Court in Hammett noted a defendant need
not touch the victim to be found guilty under subsection (a)(2).'10
However, when reciting the elements of the claim, the Court consist-
ently notes:
In order to withstand a motion to dismiss charges brought under G.S.
14-202.1(a)(1), the State must present substantial evidence of each of
the following elements: (1) the defendant was at least 16 years of age,
(2) he was five years older than his victim, (3) he willfully took or
attempted to take an indecent liberty with the victim, (4) the victim
was under 16 years of age at the time the alleged act or attempted act
occurred, and (5) the action by the defendant was for the purpose of
arousing or gratifying sexual desire."'
IV. HOLDING
While the majority in Vann concurred in the judgment, the Fourth
Circuit judges disagreed as to the interpretation of North Carolina's
Indecent Liberties Statute and the application of North Carolina case
law.'1 2 In Judge King's concurring opinion, he maintains that "I am
convinced that we are required by precedent to evaluate Vann's con-
victions under the Statute by sole resort to the categorical ap-
proach."1 1 3 Judge King reasons that the Court is not "writing on a
blank slate."1 14 He emphasizes that both the state Supreme Court in
Hartness and state's appellate courts had noted that North Carolina's
107. Id.
108. Id. at 180.
109. State v. Hammett, 642 S.E.2d 454, 459 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) ("[Alctions of masturbation
while lying in the same bed as C.H. and watching a pornographic movie were prohibited by G.S.
§ 14-202.1(a)(2)"). See also State v. Kistle, 297 S.E.2d 626, 628 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (finding no
error in the defendant's conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1 for taking photographs of a
nude female child in a sexually suggestive position).
110. Hammet, 642 S.E.2d at 459.
111. State v. Every, 578 S.E.2d 642, 647 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (referencing subsection N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1(a)(1) to the exclusion of subsection (a)(2)).
112. United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 772 (4th Cir. 2011).
113. Id. at 777 (King, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 782.
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Indecent Liberties Statute encapsulates a single offense.' Thus, the
Court is bound to apply the categorical approach.1 16 When applying
the categorical approach the prior convictions fail and cannot count
for ACCA purposes."'
However, in Judge Keenan's concurring opinion she explains that
the Court is permitted to apply the modified categorical approach be-
cause the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Hartness noted that the
"single wrong is established by a finding of various alternative ele-
ments.""" Judge Keenan explains that a textual reading of the statute
supports the proposition that alternative elements are found in both
subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Statute." 9 Thus, Judge Keenan
reasons that because the behavior described in subsection (a)(1) dif-
fers so significantly from subsection (a)(2), conceptually, the two sub-
sections describe different crimes. 1 2 0
V. ANALYSIS
Vann required the Fourth Circuit to weave through the intricacies
of North Carolina law in order to address a core question of the litiga-
tion; whether the Indecent Liberties Statute encapsulates one offense
or multiple offenses.121 Vann maintained that the Statute consists of
one offense.12 2 The government argued that the Statute consists of
multiple offenses. 1 2 3 The majority en banc panel concluded that the
Statute contains a single offense that can be established by multiple
115. Id. at 783.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 782. See also id. at 779 (noting that, because Vann's prior convictions under the
Indecent Liberties Statute did not (1) include an element of force, (2) were not for burglary,
arson, or extortion, and (3) did not involve explosives, to qualify as a violent felony under the
ACCA, the prior offenses would have to fall within the residual clause).
118. Id. at 798 (Keenan, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Hartness, 391 S.E.2d 177, 180 (N.C.
1990)) (explaining that Judge King's concurring opinion that "characterize[s] the statute as a
single offense, without more, oversimplifies the Supreme Court of North Carolina's holding in
Hartness").
119. Id. at 799. See also id. at 800 n.1 (disagreeing with Judge King's proposition, Judge
Keenan notes that she does not accept the proposition that the two subsections of the Indecent
Liberties Statute set out five fixed elements rather than alternative elements).
120. Id. at 799. See also id. at 813-14 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part) (applying the same
reasoning that the two subsections set out alternative elements, and marshalling additional sup-
port for his position by noting that the Indecent Liberties Statute corresponds with two different
sections of Model Penal Code).
121. Id. at 784.
122. See id. at 781 (arguing that the categorical approach, used where the statute describes a
single offense, should be applied; thus, implying that the statute has only one offense).
123. Id. (arguing that the modified categorical approach, used where the statute describes
multiple offenses, should be applied).
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elements. 12 4 The minority en banc panel concluded that the Statute
contains a single offense.12 5
The Supreme Court of North Carolina applied the same reading of
the Indecent Liberties Statute as the Court in Vann with regard to the
precise question of whether the Statute encompasses a single offense
or multiple offenses explaining in Hartness that "[a]s the statute indi-
cates, the crime of indecent liberties is a single offense which may be
proved by evidence of the commission of any one of a number of
acts." 1 26 Furthermore, the state Supreme Court reasoned that many
different types of behavior can satisfy the single offense.127 Likewise,
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina has consistently interpreted
North Carolina's Indecent Liberties Statute to consist of a single of-
fense.128 Citing Hartness, the Court of Appeals reasoned in State v.
Jones, 616 S.E.2d 15 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005), that a "single act can only
support one conviction" under the Statute, and not two convictions. 1 2 9
Judge Keenan reasoned that it would be an incomplete analysis if
the Fourth Circuit were to simply accept the Supreme Court of North
Carolina's indication in Hartness that the Statute is a single offense
without noting that the Statute imposes alternative elements for satis-
fying the single offense.13 o Judge King, however, found the language
that the Statute encompasses "a single offense" definitive 31 noting
that North Carolina courts have consistently rejected the notion that
subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are separate offenses with separate ele-
ments.1 3 2 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit could not reconcile its
views, particularly because the North Carolina court's interpretation
of the Indecent Liberties Statute is obscure.
For example, in Banks, the Supreme Court of North Carolina noted
that there are separate elements under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2)
of the Statute:
Under the present statute the state, in addition to the age require-
ments, must prove under subsection (1) an "immoral, improper, or
indecent" liberty committed "for the purpose of arousing or gratifying
sexual desire" and under subsection (2), a "lewd or lascivious act upon
or with the body or any part or member of the body" of the child.
124. Id. at 799 (Keenan, J. concurring).
125. Id. at 784 (King, J. concurring).
126. State v. Hartness, 391 S.E.2d 177, 180 (N.C. 1990).
127. Id.
128. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
129. State v. Jones, 616 S.E.2d 15, 20 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
130. Vann, 660 F.3d at 799.
131. Id. at 782, 791.
132. Id.
133. State v. Banks, 370 S.E.2d 398, 407 (N.C. 1988).
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However, the reasoning of the Court in Banks weakened the Court's
indication that there are separate elements under subsections (a)(1)
and (a)(2), given that it found the "conduct [of kissing] falls within the
purview of both subsections of the statute."134  Furthermore, the
Court of Appeals noted that the elements pursuant to the Indecent
Liberties Statute are:
(1) the defendant was at least 16 years of age, (2) he was five years
older than his victim, (3) he willfully took or attempted to take an
indecent liberty with the victim, (4) the victim was under 16 years of
age at the time the alleged act or attempted act occurred, and (5) the
action by the defendant was for the purpose of arousing or gratifying
sexual desire.' 3 5
To complicate matters more, North Carolina's courts have consist-
ently held that a defendant may be convicted pursuant to either sub-
section (a)(1) or (a)(2) of the Statute for the same behavior, thus
implying that there is no practical difference in the subsections. The
Court in State v. Turgeon, 261 S.E.2d 501 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980), held
that physical contact is not necessary to be actionable under subsec-
tion (a)(1) and that taking sexual photos of the victims is actiona-
ble.1 36 In State v. Hammett, 642 S.E.2d 454 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007), the
reasoning was extended to subsection (a)(2) given that the Court con-
cluded physical contact is not necessary to be actionable under subsec-
tion (a)(2) and that masturbating in the presence of a child is
actionable under the subsection.'3 7 Furthermore, in State v. Kistle, 297
S.E.2d 626 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982), the North Carolina appellate court
found that a sexually suggestive photograph of a child constitutes the
commission of a lewd and lascivious act upon or with the body, or a
part or member thereof, in violation of subsection (a)(2) of the Inde-
cent Liberties Statute.'3 Moreover, in Jones, the North Carolina ap-
pellate court convicted a defendant that had sex with his stepdaughter,
which resulted in pregnancy, under subsection (a)(1) of the Statute.'3
Thus, it is not surprising that the Fourth Circuit split on its interpreta-
tion of the Statute.
134. Id.
135. State v. Every, 578 S.E.2d 642, 647 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
136. State v. Turgeon, 261 S.E.2d 501, 503 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that no touching is
necessary to violate the Statute). See also State v. Turman, 278 S.E.2d 574, 575 (N.C. Ct. App.
1981) ("We reject the argument and hold that it is not necessary that there be a touching of the
child by the defendant in order to constitute an indecent liberty within the meaning of N.C.G.S.
14-202.1. The purpose of the statute is to give broader protection to children than the prior laws
provided. The word 'with' is not limited to mean only a physical touching." (citations omitted)).
137. State v. Hammett, 642 S.E.2d 454, 459 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
138. State v. Kistle, 297 S.E.2d 626, 628 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
139. State v. Jones, 616 S.E.2d 15, 17, 20 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
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At first glance it appears that Hartness provided the Fourth Circuit
with a complete answer. However, the ambiguity in Hartness did
nothing more than further complicate the analysis. In this instance,
Judge Keenan employed a literal interpretation of Hartness,40 while
Judge King relied on the Supreme Court of North Carolina's and the
state appellate court's application of the Indecent Liberties Statute to
inform its ruling in Hartness.1 4 ' Fortunately for Vann, the reasoning
was not outcome determinative. 142 As Judge King noted, "[e]ither ap-
proach produces the same result in Vann's case, but tomorrow is an-
other day."1 4 3 However, the Fourth Circuit's holding produces at least
two constitutional problems tomorrow: issues of federalism and equal
protection.
First, in deciding that North Carolina's Indecent Liberty Statute is
one offense with separate elements, the Fourth Circuit's en banc ma-
jority rule cannot be reconciled with North Carolina's appellate court
precedent.14 4 Thus, the Fourth Circuit runs the risk of having its opin-
ion overruled by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.14 5 In doing
so, the Supreme Court of North Carolina would be exercising the
power similar to the Supreme Court of the United States; except, of
course, that the reversal would provide no remedy to the litigants ad-
versely affected by the federal court's erroneous holding.1 4 6
Secondly, in deciding that North Carolina's Indecent Liberties Stat-
ute in practicality encapsulates multiple offenses, the majority applied
the modified categorical approach.147 This conflicts with other juris-
dictions that have interpreted North Carolina's Indecent Liberties
140. United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 800 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011) (Keenan, J., concurring)
(noting that, in her opinion, Judge King's conclusion, informed by the state's courts of appeals
decisions, which indicates the Indecent Liberties Statute encompasses five fixed elements cannot
be reconciled with the Hartness decision). See generally Cannon v. Miller, 327 S.E.2d 888 (N.C.
1985) (mem.) (noting explicitly that the Court of Appeals of North Carolina does not have the
authority to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina).
141. Vann, 660 F.3d at 782 (King, J., dissenting) (citing the Court of Appeals of North Caro-
lina's interpretation of the Statute to supplement and inform the federal court's understanding of
the Hartness decision).
142. Id. at 777.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 784. Compare id. at 799, 800 n.1 (Keenan, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Judge
King's proposition that the Statute, including both subsection (a)(1) and subsection (a)(2), sets
forth five fixed elements, but rather that it provides alternative elements for different behaviors
constituting an offense under the Statute), with State v. Coleman, 684 S.E.2d 513, 519 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2009) (listing five elements of an offense under the Statute).
145. See John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law,
41 Vand. L. Rev. 411, 415 n.11 (1988) (listing cases where state courts disagree with the federal
courts' interpretations of state law).
146. See United States v. Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 498 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting a court of
appeals panel is bound by decisions of prior panels "[a]bsent an en banc overruling or a super-
seding contrary decision of the Supreme Court").
147. Vann, 660 F.3d at 798.
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Statute.14 8 Therefore, depending on the jurisdiction a defendant is
sentenced in, the defendant's sentence may be enhanced under fed-
eral guidelines based upon a federal court's interpretation of North
Carolina law. Thus, for North Carolinians (or more precisely, anyone
with a North Carolina conviction under the Statute) the pre-Erie days
are not over and despite the federal court's request for a certification
process,14 9 North Carolina has not adopted a certification procedure.
This problem will persist, especially in light of the ACCA and other
enhanced sentencing statutes that require federal courts to analyze
state statutes. Consequently, citizens of North Carolina are not af-
forded equal protection under the laws of the state.15 o Both of these
problems could possibly be alleviated if North Carolina were to enact
a certification procedure and clarify ambiguities of its laws.1 5 1
148. See United States v. Witscher, No.10-09E, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64755, at *6 (W.D. Pa.
June 8, 2011) (applying the categorical approach to determine that a violation under subsection
(a)(2) of the Indecent Liberties Statute is not a crime of violence under the federal Career Of-
fender Act); United States v. Izaguirre-Flores, 405 F.3d 270, 278 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying the
categorical approach, hence "a common sense approach" to determine that conduct criminalized
by the Statute constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor"); United States v. Martinez-Vazquez, No.
09-10184, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26747, at *4-5 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2010) (applying the modified
categorical approach to determine that conduct criminalized under the Statute is a crime of
violence under the federal sentencing guidelines); United States v. Ramirez-Garcia, 646 F.3d
778, 783-84 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying the categorical approach to determine that conduct
criminalized by the Statute is no broader than "sexual abuse of a minor").
149. See MLC Auto., LLC v. Town of S. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 284 (4th Cir. 2008) ("Com-
pounding this lack of clarity is that North Carolina currently has no mechanism for us to certify
questions of state law to its Supreme Court . . . Based on the foregoing discussion, we ultimately
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining and staying the case
under Burford." (citation omitted)); Parmalat Capital Fin. Ltd. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 412 Fed.
App'x. 325, 327 n.2 (2nd Cir. 2011) (unpublished) ("We cannot seek guidance from the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, however, because North Carolina has no procedure by which to certify
questions of state law to its Supreme Court."); Klein v. Depuy, Inc., 506 F.3d 553, 556 n.5 (7th
Cir. 2007) ("Currently, North Carolina does not allow us to certify an unsettled question of state
law to its Supreme Court for resolution"); Nationwide Tr. Serv. Inc. v. Lowenthal, No. 1:10-CV-
192-GCM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53874, at *6-7 (W.D.N.C. May 18, 2011) (abstaining because
North Carolina does not have a certification process); In re Saturn L-Series Timing Chain Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 1920, 08:07cv298, 08:08cv79, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109978, at *52 n.10 (D. Neb.
Nov. 7, 2008) ("This Court did certify this question of law to the North Carolina Supreme Court
on September 10, 2008. To date, the North Carolina Supreme Court has offered no response.
Consequently, the Court is left to apply its own interpretation of North Carolina's law to this
legal question" (citation omitted)). See also Jessica Smith, Avoiding Prognostication and Pro-
moting Federalism: The Need for an Inter-Jurisdictional Certification Procedure in North Caro-
lina, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 2123, 2194 n.94 (1999) (listing additional cases in which courts have
expressed its interest in a certification procedure).
150. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
151. Eisenberg, supra note 1 (arguing that North Carolina can and should adopt a certifica-
tion procedure).
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CERTIFIED QUESTION
VI. CONCLUSION
"Hope for the best and prepare for the worst." 5 2 A certification
procedure would ensure that the Supreme Court of North Carolina is
the final arbiter of issues essential to the State. In Vann, the Fourth
Circuit tackled a complex issue of whether North Carolina's Indecent
Liberties Statute encapsulated one offense or multiple offenses.15 3
However, along the way, the Court split in its reasoning after encoun-
tering ambiguity in North Carolina's case law.154 Perhaps, if North
Carolina had a certification procedure, the Fourth Circuit would have
certified the question to the State Supreme Court. While there is no
guarantee that the Fourth Circuit would have certified the question to
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, or that North Carolina would
have answered the question, it undoubtedly offers more certainty than
the current procedure: make a decision and wait for results.
152. THE CONCISE OXFORD DICrlONARY OF PROVFRIs 114, (J.A. Simpson ed., Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1982).
153. United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 784 (4th Cir. 2011).
154. See id. at 793 n.4.
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